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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43258 
      ) 
v.      ) CANYON COUNTY  
) NO. CR 2014-27455 
      ) 
JEREMY COOK,    )  
      ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________ ) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Jeremy Cook pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, a second felony within fifteen years, and was sentenced to a unified term of ten 
years, with four years fixed.  He contends the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case.  
He also contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion pursuant 




Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Cook was arrested on December 14, 2014, after driving a motorcycle while 
under the influence of alcohol and allegedly attempting to elude a pursuing police 
vehicle.  (R., p.10.)  He was charged by criminal complaint with one count of operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), a second felony offense 
within fifteen years, and one count of eluding a peace officer.  (R., pp.9-11.)  Mr. Cook 
waived a preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court.  (R., pp.18, 19.)  
The State then filed an Information charging Mr. Cook with one count of DUI and 
alleging it was his second felony offense within fifteen years.  (R., pp.20-21, 22-23.)  
Mr. Cook pled guilty to the DUI count, and admitted it was his second felony DUI within 
fifteen years.  (Tr. 2/20/15, p.7, L.22 – p.9, L.23.)  In exchange, the State agreed to 
dismiss the eluding count and agreed not to pursue a persistent violator enhancement.  
(R., pp.34, 50; Tr. 2/20/15, p.2, Ls.2-6.)  
The district court sentenced Mr. Cook to a unified term of ten years, with four 
years fixed.  (R., p.52; Tr. 4/13/15, p.23, Ls.14-15.)  The judgment was entered on 
April 13, 2015.  (R., pp.52-53.)  After his attorney’s motion to withdraw was granted, 
Mr. Cook filed a pro se motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for 
reduction of sentence, which he supported with additional information.  (R., pp.54, 57-
58, 61-66.)  Mr. Cook filed a pro se notice of appeal on May 18, 2015.  (R., pp.84-88.)  
The district court denied Mr. Cook’s Rule 35 motion without a hearing on June 23, 2015.  
(R., pp.104-07.)  Mr. Cook filed an amended notice of appeal, through counsel, on 




1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Cook a 
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, in light of the mitigating 
factors that exist in this case? 
 







The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Cook A Unified 
Sentence Of Ten Years, With Four Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That 
Exist In This Case 
 
Mr. Cook asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten 
years, with four years fixed, is excessive.  Where, as here, the sentence imposed by the 
district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating 
that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”  State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting 
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).  “When a trial court exercises its 
discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’”  Id. 
(quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).  “A sentence is reasonable if it 
appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to 
achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  “When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will 
make an independent examination of the record, ‘having regard to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.’”  Id. 
(quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)). 
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The most important factor for the Court to independently examine here is the 
nature of the offense.  Mr. Cook pled guilty to one count of DUI.  At the change of plea 
hearing, the district court asked Mr. Cook, “What did you do to make you guilty [of 
Count One]?”  (Tr. 2/20/15, p.8, L.3.)  Mr. Cook answered, “Drunk and drive.”  
(Tr. 2/2/10, p.8, L.4.)  He then admitted to drinking two beers and a shot of whiskey or 
rum on the evening in question.  (Tr. 2/20/15, p.8, L.5 – p.9, L.3.)  His blood alcohol 
level was measured at .11.  (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.34, 42.) 
Mr. Cook also admitted this was his second felony DUI within fifteen years, and 
the circumstances of his prior DUI are important.  In January 2012, Mr. Cook pled guilty 
in California to vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.  (Tr. 2/20/15, p.9, Ls.10-21; 
R., p.23.)  He was driving on a two-lane highway on May 8, 2010.  (PSI, p.18.)  It was a 
windy day, and at approximately 9:00 a.m., he crossed over the center line and was 
involved in a head-on collision which resulted in a person’s death.  (Tr. 4/13/15, p.10, 
L.23 – p.11, L.14.)  No alcohol was involved, but small amounts of THC and some 
amphetamine were found in Mr. Cook’s system.  (Tr. 4/13/15, p.12, Ls.1-15.)  He told 
the presentence investigator that he smoked marijuana and took sinus pills on the night 
before the accident.  (PSI, p.23.)  Mr. Cook suffered brain damage as a result of the 
accident and has not used marijuana ever since.  (PSI, pp.23, 46.)  
In light of the nature of the instant offense and his prior felony offense, the district 
court should have imposed a shorter term of imprisonment and allowed Mr. Cook to 
complete a rider.  Mr. Cook was highly motivated for treatment and sent a letter to the 
court in advance of sentencing stating he had “never done a program” and was a 
“strong person” who can “fix [his] problems.”  (PSI, pp.47, 55.)  Mr. Cook had the 
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support of his father, his father’s girlfriend, and his fiancé.  (PSI, p.52.)  The GAIN 
evaluator recommended intensive outpatient treatment for alcohol dependence.  (PSI, 
pp.46, 53.)  The presentence investigator recommended that the district court retain 
jurisdiction and described Mr. Cook as “a good candidate for an order of retained 
jurisdiction.”  (PSI, p.27.)  A shorter term of imprisonment with a period of retained 
jurisdiction would have protected the public interest and allowed Mr. Cook to address 
his alcohol problem, just as he had previously addressed his marijuana use.  The district 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Cook’s Rule 35 Motion 
 
Mr. Cook asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
Rule 35 motion in light of the additional information he submitted to the court.  “A motion 
to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound 
discretion of the sentencing court and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be 
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.”  State v. Trent, 125 
Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).  “The denial of a motion for 
modification of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused 
its discretion.”  Id.  “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant 
must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented 
with the motion for reduction.”  Id.; see also State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 
(2007). 
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Cook admitted (again) that he had been 
drinking alcohol and driving on the night in question.  (R., p.62.)  However, he denied 
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that he eluded police and specifically challenged some of the statements set forth in the 
police reports which purportedly identified him as the person eluding police.  (R., p.62.)  
Among other things, Mr. Cook stated that the sweatshirt he was wearing was not 
consistent with the police’s description of the sweatshirt worn by the person eluding 
police; the officer watched the person eluding police leave the Rodeo Bar, but Mr. Cook 
had been drinking at the Sportsman’s Bar; the motorcycle being driven by the person 
eluding police did not have a license plate, whereas Mr. Cook’s motorcycle has a 
license plate.  (R., p.62.)  In sum, he explained, “I don’t believe [the officer] had a good 
look at the person he claims was me riding that night.”  (R., p.62.)   
The district court denied Mr. Cook’s Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.104-07.)  In its 
order, the court stated Mr. Cook did not file any additional information supporting his 
motion.  (R., p.104.)  This is incorrect.  The district court had the police reports before it 
at sentencing, but Mr. Cook did not specifically challenge these reports at sentencing.  
Thus, the statements Mr. Cook made in support of his Rule 35 motion presented new or 
additional information to the court.  The court also stated it would not consider 
Mr. Cook’s statements in light of his guilty plea.  (R., p.106.)  The court wrote: 
Whether or not there were potential defenses available to 
the Defendant, it is well established that “‘[a] valid plea of 
guilty, voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all non-
jurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or 
statutory, in prior proceedings.’”  State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 
Idaho 66, 69, 106 P.3d 392, 395 (2005) (quoting Clark v. 
State, 92 Idaho 827, 832, 452 P.2d 54, 59 (1969)); State v. 
Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86, 218 P.3d 1143, 1147 (2009).   
 
(R., p.106.)  What the court failed to recognize is that Mr. Cook did not plead guilty to 
eluding a peace officer; he pled guilty to DUI.  Al-Kotrani, Clark and Clements do not 
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stand for the proposition that a person’s valid plea of guilty to one crime waives all 
defenses that person might have to another crime. 
 Mr. Cook has never admitted he was driving the motorcycle that was eluding 
police, and it is certainly possible someone else was driving that motorcycle.  (PSI, pp. 
39, 42.)  The person driving the motorcycle ran off on foot, and another officer 
apprehended Mr. Cook outside of his garage/shed, which was near where the 
motorcycle driver ran off.  (PSI, pp.39, 42.)  The district court placed extreme emphasis 
on the eluding conduct at Mr. Cook’s sentencing.  It described the offense for which it 
was imposing sentence as follows:  
Now here’s what we have in this particular case:  We have 
you hanging out at a bar, revving your engine, doing 
something that I can perceive like Evel Knievel on your 
motorcycle, with your front wheel up in the air jumping a curb 
leaving the parking lot.  And then we have a high speed 
chase through a community where you almost hit somebody, 
you pull into your house, you get off your motorcycle, and 
then you try to run from the cops.  Now that in and of itself is 
dangerous, and we couple with that the fact that you were 
under the influence of alcohol when that occurred. 
 
(Tr. 4/13/15, p.19, L.15 – p.20, L.20.)  The court continued, “You almost—or could have 
killed somebody this most recent time as you’re hotrodding through the neighborhood 
on your motorcycle, because you clearly don’t want to be arrested for driving under the 
influence.”  (Tr. 4/13/15, p.22, Ls.1-5.)  The court determined that Mr. Cook was “a 
danger to the community” who “put everybody else at risk” and was engaged in 
“particularly egregious” behavior.  (Tr. 4/13/15, p.22, L.24 – p.23, L.1.)  These 
statements clearly did not relate to Mr. Cook’s offense of driving while intoxicated with a 
BAC of .11, which was the count to which he pled guilty.  
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 A sentencing court can, of course, consider allegations of criminal conduct at 
sentencing.  See State v. Paz, 112 Idaho 407, 409 (Ct. App. 1987).  However, it must 
exercise “due caution” in doing so.  State v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 409, 411 (Ct. App. 
1992).  The district court did not exercise due caution in considering the eluding conduct 
at Mr. Cook’s sentencing, which Mr. Cook attempted to point out (without the benefit of 
counsel) in his Rule 35 motion.  Where, as here, a district court sentences a defendant 
for an offense that is not before the court, and considers the existence of alleged 
criminal activity without due caution, the proper remedy is for this Court to vacate the 
sentence and remand for resentencing.  See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 
229 (Ct. App. 1999) (vacating and remanding for resentencing where “the district court 
went beyond [its] authority and essentially imposed sentence for offenses other than the 
one that was before the court”).   
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cook respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his sentence be vacated and the case be 
remanded to the district court for resentencing. 
 DATED this 3rd day of December, 2015. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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